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Abstract Loss aversion is a defining characteristic of pros-
pect theory, whereby responses are stronger to losses than to
equivalent ly s ized gains (Kahneman & Tversky
Econometrica, 47, 263–291, 1979). Bymonitoring electroder-
mal activity (EDA) during a gambling task, in this study we
examined physiological activity during risky decisions, as
well as to both obtained (e.g., gains and losses) and counter-
factual (e.g., narrowly missed gains and losses) outcomes.
During the bet selection phase, EDA increased linearly with
bet size, highlighting the role of somatic signals in decision-
making under uncertainty in a task without any learning re-
quirement. Outcome-related EDA scaled with the magnitudes
of monetary wins and losses, and losses had a stronger impact
on EDA than did equivalently sized wins. Narrowly missed
wins (i.e., near-wins) and narrowly missed losses (i.e., near-
losses) also evoked EDA responses, and the change of EDA
as a function of the size of the missed outcome was modestly
greater for near-losses than for near-wins, suggesting that
near-losses have more impact on subjective value than do
near-wins. Across individuals, the slope for choice-related
EDA (as a function of bet size) correlated with the slope for
outcome-related EDA as a function of both the obtained and
counterfactual outcome magnitudes, and these correlations
were stronger for loss and near-loss conditions than for win
and near-win conditions. Taken together, these asymmetrical
EDA patterns to objective wins and losses, as well as to near-
wins and near-losses, provide a psychophysiological instanti-
ation of the value function curve in prospect theory, which is
steeper in the negative than in the positive domain.
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Within human decision-making, it is well recognized that
Blosses loom larger than gains,^ a phenomenon labeled loss
aversion (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). For example, when
faced with a mixed gamble with a 50 % chance of winning
£150 and a 50 % chance of losing £100, most people refuse
this gamble, even though the expected value is clearly posi-
tive. Typically, the minimum gain that people need to balance
an equal chance of losing money is approximately twice the
size of the loss (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). This asymme-
try in the values assigned to gains and losses is represented by
the Bvalue function^ in prospect theory, in that the curve is
shallower for gains and steeper for losses. The overweighting
of losses may convey adaptive benefits for survival and repro-
duction (Kahneman, 2011).
Recent work has linked loss aversion to the brain circuitry
involved in emotional processing. In a series of gambles with
a 50/50 chance of gaining or losing money, individual esti-
mates of behavioral loss aversion were associated with a neu-
ral instantiation of loss aversion in ventral striatum and pre-
frontal cortex (Tom, Fox, Trepel, & Poldrack, 2007). Brain
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injury to the amygdala was seen to abolish loss aversion (De
Martino, Camerer, & Adolphs, 2010), and using functional
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) in healthy participants,
behavioral loss aversion correlated with amygdala response to
losses relative to gains (Sokol-Hessner, Camerer, & Phelps,
2013). In addition to its role in threat detection and negative
emotional processing, the amygdala mobilizes the autonomic
nervous system, substantiating the view that loss aversion is
an emotional process (Sokol-Hessner, Hartley, Hamilton, &
Phelps, 2015; Sokol-Hessner et al., 2009; Takahashi et al.,
2012; see Phelps, Lempert, & Sokol-Hessner, 2014, for a re-
view). Indeed, propranolol, a norepinephrine beta-blocker that
acts primarily to attenuate autonomic arousal, was recently
seen to reduce loss aversion (Sokol-Hessner, Lackovic, et
al., 2015).
Psychophysiology is a useful tool for characterizing these
emotional influences. In the present study, we focused on
electrodermal activity (EDA) as a marker of sympathetic ner-
vous system activity, which is known to scale with the dimen-
sion of arousal, representing emotional intensity (see Dawson,
Schell, & Filion, 2007, for a review). In experiments using the
Iowa Gambling Task, EDA in the few seconds before choices
(Banticipatory skin conductance responses^) discriminated be-
tween advantageous and disadvantageous decisions (Bechara,
Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio, 1997). The Iowa Gambling
Task conflates responses to risk and to uncertainty with those
driving learning of the advantageous strategy, but in a task
offering a 50/50 chance of winning or losing money, losses
were seen to elicit greater EDA than wins, and this differential
arousal correlated with a behavioral index of loss aversion
(Sokol-Hessner et al., 2009). In this study, the researchers
sought to extend these observations to betting behavior in a
task with no overt learning component. Using a wheel-of-
fortune game, participants placed a bet on whether the
wheel would stop on a winning, losing, or neutral seg-
ment. We recorded EDA during both the bet selection
and outcome phases. We predicted that selection-related
EDA would scale linearly with bet size (see also Studer
& Clark, 2011). We further predicted that outcome-
related EDA would increase as a function of the mag-
nitudes of wins and losses. On the basis of the phenom-
enon of loss aversion, we predicted a steeper magnitude
function for losses than for wins.
The second objective of our study was to investigate EDA
reactivity to salient, nonobtained outcomes. Counterfactual
thinking refers to the mental process by which people consider
salient alternatives to the events that actually happened
(Roese, 1997). Upward counterfactual thoughts involve the
comparison of the obtained outcome with a more desirable
alternative (eliciting regret), whereas downward counterfactu-
al thoughts involve the comparison of the obtained outcome
with a less desirable alternative (prompting relief). These
counterfactuals have large impacts on emotional responses
and behavioral regulation (see Epstude & Roese, 2008, for a
review).
Previous research has shown that regret is associated with
significant EDA increases (Camille et al., 2004). In a com-
bined fMRI and EDA study using electric shocks as
outcomes, Chandrasekhar, Capra, Moore, Noussair, and
Berns (2008) reported that regret (e.g., narrowly missing the
safe outcome and being shocked) elicited greater EDA than
relief (e.g., narrowly missing electric shock and being safe),
but the direct contrast of upward and downward counterfac-
tuals in that study was confounded by delivery of the electric
shock. The use of a wheel-of-fortune task in the present study
enabled near outcomes, in which the spinner stopped just next
to either the win (i.e., near-win) or the loss (near-loss) segment
(see Fig. 1), to be directly compared while keeping the objec-
tive value of the outcome neutral. To index counterfactual
thinking, participants provided trial-by-trial ratings of per-
ceived luckiness (Wu, van Dijk, & Clark, 2015). Near-wins
have previously been shown to elicit downward counterfactu-
al thoughts and decreased self-perceived luck, whereas near-
losses elicited upward counterfactual thoughts and increased
self-perceived luck (Wohl & Enzle, 2003; Wu et al., 2015).
Near-wins and near-losses also have differential effects on a
facial electromyography index of positive affect (Wu et al.,
2015). We predicted that EDA would increase for both near-
wins and near-losses in this study.
Method
Participants
We recruited 51 healthy volunteers (26 men, 25 women; mean
age = 24.5 years, SD = 4.2, age range = 19–35) from the
student population at the University of Cambridge for a study
Fig. 1 Wheel-of-fortune task. The final position of the red line indicated
the outcome—a near-win outcome, in this example
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of gambling behavior. We determined this sample size on
the basis of previous EDA studies (Clark, Li, et al.,
2012; Lang, Greenwald, Bradley, & Hamm, 1993).
Our recruitment strategy excluded psychology and eco-
nomics students. The study was conducted in accor-
dance with the Declaration of Helsinki and was ap-
proved by the University of Cambridge Psychology
Research Ethics Committee. Written informed consent
was obtained from all participants. Volunteers attended
an individual testing session and were paid a fixed fee
as reimbursement for their time, plus a financial bonus
that was proportional to their actual earnings in the
gambling task. During their session, participants also
completed an emotional reactivity task and a regret task
that have been reported elsewhere (Wu & Clark, 2015).
Wheel-of-fortune task
Participants played a computerized wheel-of-fortune game
adapted from Wu et al. (2015; see Fig. 1). The task was pro-
grammed in MATLAB using the Psychophysics Toolbox ex-
tensions (Brainard, 1997). On each trial, the wheel was divid-
ed into four segments: a gain and a loss segment (of different
colors) were always separated by two Bnull outcome^ seg-
ments. The + or – symbols in each segment indicated the
amounts that participants stood to win or lose, and the number
(e.g., 10) indicated the size of the win/loss, as a multiplier of
the amount that participants bet on each round. For instance, +
10Xmeant that the participant would win 10 times the amount
bet, and –10X meant that he or she would lose 10 times the
amount bet. In an important modification of our previous task
(Wu et al., 2015), rather than depicting the spin by highlight-
ing each segment successively, we used a line vector as the
spinner, which allowed the outcomes to fall at varying dis-
tances from the boundary to the next segment.
At the beginning of each trial, the participant was asked to
choose a bet between £0.10 and £0.90, displayed in £0.10
increments (see Fig. 2). Bets were anchored at £0.50, and the
participant adjusted the bet size by moving the circle with the
left and right arrow buttons on the keyboard. Following bet
selection, the spinner on the wheel spun for an anticipation
interval (5.3–6.9 s), during which the spinner decelerated to a
standstill. The outcome phase then lasted 1 s, during which the
spinner stopped, with accompanying auditory feedback (an ap-
plause sound for winning outcomes, a booing sound for losing
outcomes, and a thud sound for null outcomes), and the numer-
ic outcome was displayed for 1 s. Following the outcome
phase, a luck rating was displayed using a 9-point visual ana-
logue scale (BHow lucky did you feel?^), with 1 indicating
extremely unlucky and 9 indicating extremely lucky. The default
luck rating was 5, and the participant could adjust the number
by moving the circle with the left and right arrow buttons. No
time constraints were imposed on bet selection or luck ratings.
During a 10-s intertrial interval, only a fixation cross was
displayed, to allow for recovery of the physiological signals.
Participants completed 76 trials in total, comprising 19
wins and 19 losses, respectively, in which participants either
won or lost 10 times their bet, respectively. Ten near-wins and
ten near-losses were delivered, in which participants experi-
enced a null outcome that was close (within 1.8° of the seg-
ment boundary) to a major win or loss. To enhance the partic-
ipant’s impression that the spinner was random, we included
18 filler trials in which the spinner landed near the center of
the null segment, close to neither a win nor a loss. We did not
include the filler trials in our analysis strategy. The participants
were given a funnel debriefing after testing (i.e., starting with
broad, open questions about the purpose of the experiment
and gradually narrowing down); no participants indicated
any suspicions regarding the delivered outcomes.
Recording equipment
During the gambling task, EDAwas recorded via a BIOPAC
MP36 unit (BIOPAC Systems Ltd., Goleta, CA, USA), fol-
lowing the previous methods (Clark, Crooks, Clarke, Aitken,
& Dunn, 2012; Clark, Li, et al., 2012). Facial muscle reactiv-
ity on the zygomaticus and corrugator sites was also collected
during the task, but these results are reported elsewhere. The
Fig. 2 Sequence of events in a single trial. The arrow on the second
screen indicates the movement direction of the spinner. This trial
displays a win outcome, on which the participant has won 10 times the
amount bet
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BIOPAC unit, sampling at 1000 Hz, was connected to the
stimulus delivery computer and to a second recording computer
running AcqKnowledge 4.1 software. The task-related events
occurring on the stimulus delivery computer were synchro-
nized to the psychophysiological trace using digital channels.
EDAwas measured using two grounded Ag–AgCl electrodes
(a BIOPAC TSD203 transducer with a GSR100C amplifier
module; gain = 5 V, low-pass filter at 1.0 Hz, high-pass filter
to block DC), secured on the distal phalange of the index and
middle fingers of the nondominant hand. Isotonic paste
(BIOPAC Gel101, with a recommended NaCl concentration
of 0.05M) was used as the electrolyte, and participants washed
their hands prior to attachment of the electrodes. The EDA
signal was transformed into units of microsiemens (μS) using
AcqKnowledge. Following attachment of the EDA electrodes,
5 min of resting-state data were acquired, to allow for signal
stabilization, prior to commencing the gambling task.
Data analysis
The data were screened prior to analysis and resampled at
100 Hz. Of the 51 participants, one did not exhibit any phasic
changes in EDA and did not show a reliable response to any
stimuli, and thus was excluded from the analysis as a nonre-
sponder. The EDA data were logarithmically transformed,
given their typical positive skew distribution (Boucsein,
1992), and extracted for the selection phase and the feedback
phase separately, using in-house scripts developed in R Studio
(R Development Core Team, 2008). The last 2 s of the inter-
trial interval (ITI) was used as a trial-by-trial baseline to con-
trol for typical low-frequency drift in and EDA signal. For
each trial, the mean EDAvalues were extracted in 4 × 2 s bins
from the onset of the choice phase and the onset of the out-
come phase. An EDA summary measure was calculated as the
maximum change in Bins 2–4 (i.e., 2–8 s postchoice or 2–8 s
postoutcome) from the baseline value, given the typical time
course for EDA changes (Dawson et al., 2007).
We used R and lme4 (Bates, Maechler, & Bolker, 2012) to
perform a linearmixed-effects analysis.We used linearmixed-
effects modeling via restricted maximum likelihood for all
repeated measures analyses so as to reduce information loss
when evaluating large, unbalanced data sets after signal stan-
dardization (Judd, Westfall, & Kenny, 2012). The participant
ID number was included in the model as a random-effect
dummy variable. For selection-related EDA, we used the
model EDA ~ Bet + (1 | Participant), where Bet was a contin-
uous fixed-effect factor, and Participant was a random-effect
factor. For subjective luck ratings and outcome-related EDA,
we used the model EDA (or rating) ~ Outcome Magnitude +
(1 | Participant), where Outcome Magnitude was a continuous
fixed-effect factor. We first assessed the effects of outcome
magnitude for objective win and loss outcomes separately,
and then compared the slopes for each participant (i.e., the
EDA or luck rating, as a function of the outcome magnitude)
between the gain and loss conditions. Similarly, for near-win
and near-loss outcomes, we tested the effects of the
nonobtained outcome magnitude separately for near-wins
and near-losses, and then compared the two slopes derived
from each participant. Visual inspection of residual plots did
not reveal any obvious deviation from homoscedasticity or
normality. All p values were derived by the lmerTest package
(Kuznetsova, Christensen, & Brockhoff, 2012).
Results
The average bet latencywas 2.91 s (SD = 2.0), and the average
rating latency was 2.44 s (SD = 1.75). On average, participants
bet 45 British pence (i.e., £0.45, SD = 0.18) on each trial. The
mean numbers of trials per participant at each level of bet are
shown in Table 1. Overall, participants wonmoney on the task
(M = £9.59, SD = 16.43): one-sample t test against zero, t =
4.03, df = 50, p < .001. This appeared to be driven by a betting
strategy in which participants reduced their bets following
wins (M = –5.77 p, SD = 8.69), t = –4.74, df = 50, p < .001,
to a greater extent than the corresponding increase in bets
following losses (M = 3.40 p, SD = 9.76), t = 2.49, df = 50,
p = .016. Since the objective probabilities of winning and
losing were equal, this asymmetrical gambler’s fallacy led to
participants accumulating a profit in the long run.
Selection-related EDA
When fitting selection-related EDA, we found a significant
linear relationship between bet size and EDA, b = 6.30 ×
10–4, SE = 9.15 × 10–5, t = 6.88, p < .001, such that higher
bets were associated greater EDA (see Fig. 3a).
Outcome-related EDA
Wins versus lossesWhen we fitted outcome-related EDA,
a significant linear relationship emerged between the size of
the win and EDA, b = 2.625 × 10–5, SE = 7.474 × 10–6, t =
3.15, p < .001, and between the size of the loss and EDA, b =
8.35 × 10–5, SE = 1.01 × 10–5, t = 8.27, p < .001, with larger
monetary outcomes being associated with a greater EDA in-
crease. In a direct test, the EDA slope (as a function of out-
come magnitude) was significantly steeper for losses than for
wins, t = 5.760, p < .001 (see Fig. 3b).
Table 1 Number of trials under each bet size
10 p 20 p 30 p 40 p 50 p 60 p 70 p 80 p 90 p
Mean 15.41 10.31 8.47 6.08 9.80 4.06 3.76 3.12 14.98
SD 16.61 9.63 8.28 7.12 9.98 5.11 4.91 4.16 20.09
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Near-wins versus near-losses We also found a significant
linear relationship between the magnitude of the
nonobtained win (i.e., near-win) and EDA, b = 6.34 × 10–5,
SE = 9.79 × 10–6, t = 6.48, p < .001, and between the magni-
tude of the nonobtained loss (i.e., near-loss) and EDA, b =
7.23 × 10–5, SE = 1.21 × 10–5, t = 6.00, p < .001, such that
nearly missing higher-magnitude outcomes (either gains or
losses) elicited stronger EDA.1 Similar to the effect for the
objective outcomes, the slope of EDA sensitivity was steeper
for near-losses than for near-wins, t = 2.46, p = .017 (see
Fig. 3c). Although the trend lines for near-wins and near-
losses appear to be of similar steepness in Fig. 3c, we note
that the lower EDA responses in the near-win upper range
(600–800) are for trials with a limited number of observations
(indicated by the relative sizes of the data points).
Relationships between selection-related
and outcome-related EDA
The slope of selection-related EDA correlated significantly
with the slopes of EDA for both wins, r = .55, p < .001, and
losses, r = .76, p < .001. A Williams test indicated that the
1 The average EDA response when the spinner was in the middle of the
null segment was 0.002 (SD = 0.056), collapsing together the two events
of the spinner leaving a win or a loss segment.
Fig. 3 Psychophysiological activity and subjective ratings during the
wheel-of-fortune task. a Electrodermal activity (EDA) responses to bet
size. b EDA responses to wins and losses. c EDA responses to near-wins
and near-losses. d Luck ratings for wins and losses. e Luck ratings for
near-wins and near-losses. For all graphs, error bars represent standard
errors of the means of the observed data, and the fitted lines are derived
from regression models. The size of each data point is proportional to the
number of observations within each panel
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slope of selection-related EDA was correlated to a greater
degree with the slope of EDA for losses than with the slope
of EDA for gains, t = 2.53, df = 47, p = .015. The slope of
selection-related EDA also significantly correlated with
the slopes of EDA for both nonobtained wins (near-
wins), r = .48, p < .001, and nonobtained losses (near-
losses), r = .83, p < .001. Again, the slope of selection-related
EDA showed a stronger correlation with the slope of EDA for
near-losses than with the slope of EDA for near-wins,
Williams test t = 4.15, df = 47, p < .001.
Luck ratings
Wins versus losses A significant linear relationship was
apparent between the size of a win and the subsequent
luck ratings, b = 2.56 × 10–3, SE = 1.64 × 10–4, t =
15.66, p < .001, such that larger gains were perceived as
being luckier. There was also a significant linear relationship
between the size of a loss and luck ratings, b = 2.29 ×
10–3, SE = 1.55 × 10–4, t = 14.79, p < .001, such that
larger losses were perceived as being unluckier. A direct
test of the difference between the two slopes for luck
ratings as a function of win and loss magnitude was not
significant, t = 0.85, p > .250 (see Fig. 3d).
Near-wins versus near-losses We found a significant linear
relationship between the size of a nonobtained win (i.e., near-
win) and luck ratings, b = –1.34 × 10–3, SE = 1.79 × 10–4, t = –
6.36, p < .001, with larger nonobtained wins being perceived
as unluckier. We also discovered a significant linear relation-
ship between the size of a nonobtained loss (i.e., near-loss)
and luck ratings, b = –1.21 × 10–3, SE = 2.25 × 10–4, t = –5.38,
p < .001. No significant difference was apparent between the
slope of luck ratings as a function of the magnitude of near-
wins and the slope of luck ratings as a function of the magni-
tude of near-losses, t = 0.39, p > .250 (see Fig. 3e).
Discussion
Using a gambling task, we first observed that outcome-related
EDA varied positively with the magnitude of the obtained
outcomes, in response to both winning and losing, with the
strongest responses occurring for large wins or losses. This is
in keeping with a substantial literature showing that EDA is a
sensitive marker of emotional intensity (Dawson et al., 2007).
For example, EDA increased linearly with self-reported arous-
al in response to emotional images from the International
Affective Picture System (Lang, Greenwald, Bradley, &
Hamm, 1993). However, in that study the slope of EDA as a
function of the size of the obtained outcomes was reliably
steeper for losses than for gains, consistent with a previous
observation that losses elicit stronger EDA than equivalent-
sized gains (Sokol-Hessner et al., 2009).
Importantly, EDA also varied positively with the magni-
tude of counterfactual outcomes, for both missed gains (i.e.,
near-wins) and missed losses (i.e., near-losses), such that larg-
er missed outcomes evoked stronger EDA. Past work has
shown that near-wins delivered on slot machines (e.g., two
cherries on the pay line, with a third cherry falling just short)
were associated with EDA increases (Clark, Crooks, Clarke,
Aitken, & Dunn, 2012; Clark et al., 2013; Dixon et al., 2011).
The present data extend these earlier observations in at least
two important ways. First, the effect is not restricted to near-
wins, but is also seen following near-losses (and is in fact
stronger for near-losses). Second, the processing of near out-
comes, in terms of both EDA and luck ratings, scales positive-
ly with the magnitude of the outcome that was missed. This
observation strengthens an interpretation of these narrowly
missed outcomes in terms of counterfactual thinking, whereby
near-wins induce upward counterfactual thoughts and elicit
regret, whereas near-losses induce downward counterfactuals
and elicit relief (Wu et al., 2015; Zhang & Covey, 2014).
In addition, the slope of EDA as a function of the magni-
tude of narrowly missed losses (i.e., near-losses) was steeper
than the slope for narrowly missed wins (i.e., near-wins),
mimicking the EDA finding that losses loom larger than gains
(Sokol-Hessner et al., 2009). Although this is a smaller effect
than the difference for obtained losses and gains (see Fig. 3c),
it is statistically reliable, and the trend line for near-wins
in Fig. 3c is likely biased by the smaller number of
observations in the upper range. According to the value
function curve, near-wins are represented in the shallow
part of the gain curve, and near-losses are represented in
the steep part of the loss curve. Because the value func-
tion curve is asymmetrical, such that the loss curve is
much steeper than the gain section, the elimination of a
loss (i.e., a near-loss) has stronger impact on subjective
value than does the elimination of a gain (i.e., a near-
win), and this is indexed by steeper EDA responses to
near-losses than to near-wins.
In describing the value function, previous research in be-
havioral economics has relied heavily on the use of anecdotal
scenarios to elicit subjective responses to loss and nongain
events (Kahneman, 2011; Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler,
1986). In a classic Bframing^ study, the loss could be formu-
lated as a price increase or a cut in wages, as compared to the
nongain, formulated as the cancellation of a former discount
or wage increase (Kahneman et al., 1986). The observation
that people respond more strongly to near-losses than to ob-
jectively equivalent near-gains has been interpreted in terms of
the (anticipated) loss accessing the steeper convex region of
the value function, whereas the (anticipated) gain is evaluated
against the shallower concave region. We utilized EDA as an
objective measure of emotional intensity. An important
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advantage of using a multishot laboratory task is that we were
able to deliver near-wins and near-losses that were objectively
identical neutral outcomes. EDA further shows high sensitiv-
ity to the magnitudes of both obtained and nonobtained out-
comes, allowing a fuller characterization of the shape of the
value function for this psychophysiological index.
Near-wins decreased and near-losses increased self-
perceived luck, consistent with our previous observations
(Wu et al., 2015). Self-perceived luck varied linearly as a
function of the magnitude of the counterfactual outcome for
both near-wins and near-losses, with the largest counterfactual
outcome being perceived as most unlucky (or lucky).
However, the response patterns for the luck ratings did not
differ reliably across near-wins and near-losses, or between
objective wins and losses. It is likely that luck ratings empha-
size the perception of chance (Teigen, 1995), as opposed to
hedonic or motivational aspects of outcome processing
(Clark, Lawrence, Astley-Jones, & Gray, 2009), and future
research will be needed to corroborate these asymmetries with
a broader range of affective ratings.
Previous research has suggested that sounds can increase
physiological arousal and play an important role in the main-
tenance and reinforcement of gambling behavior (Dixon et al.,
2014). Here, losing outcomes were accompanied by a
Bbooing^ sound, whereas wins were paired with an Bapplause^
sound. It is conceivable that differences in the emotional po-
tencies or saliences of these audio clips could have contributed
to the asymmetrical pattern observed for obtained losses and
wins, but critically, this cannot underlie the correlations be-
tween the EDA responses and the magnitude of wins and
losses. Furthermore, near-wins and near-losses were both ac-
companied by an identical Bthud^ sound, and thus the asym-
metrical EDA response pattern cannot be a sensory effect, but
must be attributable to the subjective appraisal of these
outcomes.
Selection-related EDA varied positively with the bet size,
with the greatest EDA to large bets. Early work on Banticipa-
tory skin conduction responses^ described somatic markers
during risky as compared to safe decisions in an environment
in which participants were required to learn the gain and loss
contingencies of different decks (Bechara et al., 1997).
Subsequent work has shown physiological signaling in a task
without any overt learning requirement, with high bets being
accompanied by greater EDA in a binary manner (Studer &
Clark, 2011). A recent study showed that EDA is sensitive to
explicit risk, defined as the variance across possible outcomes
within a gambling option, with a high-risk option eliciting
large EDA (Holper, Wolf, & Tobler, 2014). The present study
has more fully revealed the exquisite sensitivity of EDA reac-
tivity as a linear function of bet size. In our task, the expected
values were neutral across all trials, and the magnitudes of
potential wins and losses were explicitly presented; therefore,
there was no optimal strategy to be learned or any requirement
for sampling or exploration. This finding adds to research on
the somatic marker hypothesis by using a decision-making
task without any learning or ambiguous context (Crone,
Somsen, Van Beek, & Van Der Molen, 2004; Damasio, 2008).
Across individuals, the slope of selection-related EDA cor-
related with the slopes of EDA for both factual outcomes
(wins and losses) and counterfactual outcomes (near-wins
and near-losses). This correlational result is consistent with a
key tenet of the somatic marker hypothesis: that psychophys-
iological responses to rewarded or punished outcomes are
reactivated during subsequent decisional processing
(Bdeliberation^). As a more unexpected result, the slope of
selection-related EDA was correlated more strongly (accord-
ing to a formal Williams test) with the EDA slope for losses
than with the EDA slope for gains. Similarly, the slope of
selection-related EDA was correlated more strongly with the
EDA slope for near-losses than with that for near-wins. This
represents a further instance of Blosses looming larger,^ and
more generally it implicates an updating process through
which choice outcomes shape subsequent risk-sensitive deci-
sions, disproportionately weighing negative outcomes over
positive outcomes. We interpret this as evidence that the phys-
iological states associated with loss aversion feed forward to
bias subsequent risky betting decisions.
Some limitations of the study should be noted. Changes in
EDA are sluggish, and our design did not vary (jitter) the
interval between the gambling outcomes and the subsequent
rating, raising the possibility that the EDA responses time-
locked to outcome delivery may have been influenced by
the subsequent luck ratings. Indeed, in past work, introspec-
tive emotional ratings have been found to amplify stimulus-
related physiological responses (Hutcherson et al., 2005), but
this is unlikely to account for the differential responses to
gain- and loss-related outcomes in our results. Primarily, the
EDA slopes for losses and near-losses were reliably steeper
than the corresponding slopes for wins and near-wins, where-
as such differences were not observed on the luck ratings. As
such, we infer that EDA responses reflect outcome appraisal
processes more closely than do luck ratings. In addition, the
significant correlations between bet- and outcome-related
EDA point to an updating mechanism rather than an intro-
spective process. Future decision-making research could ben-
efit by using measurements with better temporal resolution—
for example, pupil dilation (Lempert, Glimcher, & Phelps,
2015). For instance, recent studies have shown that pupil di-
lation is associated with a shift between exploitation and ex-
ploration in a reinforcement-learning task (Jepma &
Nieuwenhuis, 2011), as well as with risk prediction error in
a gambling task (Preuschoff, ’t Hart, & Einhäuser, 2011).
Taken together, these asymmetrical responses in EDA to
objective wins and losses, as well as to counterfactual out-
comes (near-wins and near-losses), provide a psychophysio-
logical instantiation for the value function in prospect theory,
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which is steeper in the negative than in the positive domain.
The further sensitivity of EDA to betting behavior at the point
of decision, along with associations between decision- and
outcome-related activity, help to integrate this concept from
behavioral economics with the notion of somatic markers
from decision neuroscience.
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